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procedures too complex to be regulated by the courts without adequate guidelines. Until the Florida Legislature establishes necessary standards and regulations, employees not under the NLRA will continue to experience an effective
denial of their constitutional rights.

J. PENN

CAROLAN,

III

DEBTOR-CREDITOR RELATIONS: THE FLORIDA SUPREME
COURT HELPS THOSE WHO HELP THEMSELVES
Northside Motors of Florida,Inc. v. Brinkley, 282 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 1973)
Appellee entered a conditional sales contract1 with appellant for the purchase of a used car. The contract provided that upon default in payment
appellant could enter appellee's premises without notice, and repossess. Appellant also reserved the right to assert all remedies available to a secured
party under the Uniform Commercial Code. After making two payments,
appellee defaulted. Three months later appellant took possession of the
automobile from appellee's home without his knowledge or consent. Appellee
brought suit for unlawful conversion and damages. The trial court held that
Florida Statutes, section 679.503,2 which gives a secured creditor the right to
repossess without judicial process, was unconstitutional as applied to the facts
of the instant case. On direct appeal the Supreme Court of Florida reversed
and HELD, self-help repossession by a creditor does not constitute sufficient
state action to invoke the fourteenth amendment.3
Prior to the twentieth century laws governing commercial transactions
varied widely from state to state.4 Viewing these inconsistencies as an impediment to industrialization, businessmen began to press for uniformity.5 Initial
1. "A 'conditional sales contract' is a contract for sale of personal property under which
possession is delivered to buyer but title is retained in seller . .. until performance of some
condition, usually payment of purchase price, when title passes to buyer." Northwest Realty
Co. v. Perez, 81 SD. 500, 503, 137 N.W2d 345, 847 (1965).
2. FLA. STAT. §679.503 (1971), by which Florida enacted UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§9-503, provides in pertinent part: "Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default
the right to take possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace or may proceed by action."
3. 282 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 1973) (Ervin, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
4. C. BUNN, H. SNEAD & R. SPEIDEL, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

(1964).
5.

Id.
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attempts, 6 although moderately successful, led reformers to conclude that a
uniform codification of commercial law would provide the most desirable
framework for business transactions7 Efforts in pursuance of this goal culminated in the Uniform Commercial Code.8 Recognizing the essential uniformity of purpose among security devices,9 the drafters formulated a comprehensive article dealing with secured transactions in order to "provide a simple,
unified structure within which secured financing can go forward with less cost
and gTeater certainty."' 1 Because extra-judicial repossession was viewed as an
effective means of implementing this goal, it was incorporated in section
9-503.11
The adoption of the Code by the various states accelerated the trend
toward commercial efficiency, resulting in the depersonalization of debtorcreditor relationships. Consequently, a countercurrent of consumer protection
developed to combat the erosion of property rights emanating from the commercial use of standard form contracts and summary terminations.12 Initial
thrusts centered on the disclosure of harsh and unreasonable provisions prior
to execution of the contract, 13 and the legal focus remained upon the inception
of the credit relationship until 1969 when the United States Supreme Court

6. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws prepared the
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law in 1896, the Uniform Sales Act in 1906, the Uniform
Conditional Sales Act in 1918, and the Uniform Trust Receipts Act in 1933. Carrington, A
Foreword to the Study of the Uniform Commercial Code, 14 Wyo. L.J. 17, 18 (1959).
7. Id.
8. Brief for Florida Comm'n for Uniformity of Legislation as Amicus Curiae at 1-2,
Northside Motors of Florida, Inc. v. Brinkley, 282 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 1973).
9. In response to changing commercial needs the common law had developed differing
types of security devices, each with its own rules regarding default. In Florida, for example,
where title remained in the seller, the transaction was called a conditional sale, and the
creditor was permitted to use self-help if the contract authorized such action. Percifield v.
State, 93 Fla. 424, 150 So. 638 (1933). However, if title passed to the buyer, the agreement
was called a chattel mortgage, and the creditor's only remedy on default was to foreclose
on his lien. Snow v. Nowlin, 125 Fla. 166, 169 So. 598 (1936). Since all the devices were
means of securing money debts by personal property, the drafters of the Code decided to
discard such historical discriminations in favor of functional guidelines. See Comment,
Remedies on Default Under the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code as Compared to
Remedies Under Conditional Sales, 39 MARQ. L. REV. 246 (1956); Project, California Chattel
Security and Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code, 8 U.C.L.A.L. Rv. 806 (1961).
10. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §9-101, Comment.
11. Birnbaum, Article 9-A Restatement and Revision of Chattel Security, 1952 Wis. L.
REv. 349, 389-90.
12. Comment, Constitutional Law: Replevin Statute Authorizing Seizure of Property
Without Notice and Hearing Held Denial of Due Process and Seizure of Property Under
Such a Statute Without Warrant Violates the Fourth Amendment, 55 MINN. L. REv. 634, 636
(1971).
13. See Note, Provisional Remedies in New York Reappraised Under Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corporation: A Constitutional Fly in the Creditors' Ointment, 34 ALBANY L. Rv.
426 (1970).
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15
decided Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.14 Contrary to traditional theory,
the Court found the interim freezing of wages in a pre-judgment garnishment
action to be a deprivation of property within the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment. Since the garnishment order became effective without affording
petitioner notice or an opportunity to be heard, the Court held it violative
of due process.
Thus, by extending legal focus to the dissolution of the credit relationship,
Sniadach opened new avenues for consumer protectionists. 16 However, the
opinion offered little guidance as to the precise violation that had been condemned; 17 and when forced to delimit the scope of Sniadach, lower courts
divided between two interpretations. Some courts, noting that Justice Douglas
had emphasized the distinctive quality of the property interest involved' s and
the severe hardship that its deprivation would entail, 9 concluded that a

14. 395 U.S. 337 (1969). In accord with Wisconsin's statutory procedure, respondent
instituted a garnishment action against petitioner and her employer as garnishee, alleging
that petitioner was in default on a promissory note. Petitioner moved that the garnishment
proceedings be dismissed, claiming that the freezing of her wages pending final judgment on
respondent's claim amounted to a deprivation of property without due process of law.
15. In its most recent prior opinion on such a procedure, the Supreme Court stated:
"Nothing is more common than to allow parties alleging themselves to be creditors to establish in advance by attachment a lien dependent for its effect upon the result of the suit."
Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 31 (1928). In the interim years, lower courts utilized two
theories to reconcile this statement with the general notion that due process requires notice
and an opportunity to be heard. One approach was to hold that, since the procedure merely
deprived a debtor of possession and use of the property pending the outcome of the litigation, he had not been deprived of any interest protected by the due process clause. E.g.,
Byrd v. Rector, 112 W. Va. 192, 163 S.E. 845 (1932). Although conceding that possession was
a property interest protected by the fourteenth amendment, other courts held that, since
the attachment caused only a temporary impediment to possession it did not amount to a
deprivation within the meaning of the due process clause. E.g., Mclnnes v. McKay, 127 Me.
110, 141 A. 699 (1928), af'd per curiam, 279 U.S. 820 (1929).
16. Prior to Sniadach a debtor's available defenses were limited to those dealing with
the inception of the credit relationship, such as fraud or duress, and a breach of the agreement by the creditor. As long as the creditor followed the terms of the agreement the debtor
was generally without recourse. However, Sniadach indicated that debtors were protected by
procedural due process throughout the entire credit relationship, thus providing them a legal
argument even in situations where the creditor acted in accord with his contractual rights.
17. After stressing the hardship involved, Justice Douglas concluded: "Where the taking
of one's property is so obvious, it needs no extended argument to conclude that absent notice
and a prior hearing . . .this prejudgment garnishment procedure violates the fundamental
principles of due process." 395 U.S. at 342. In a strongly worded dissent Justice Black argued
that the Court had struck down the procedure merely because it considered the legislative
policy unwise. The decision, therefore, was "a plain judicial usurpation of state legislative
power." Id. at 345. The divergence of opinions can be viewed as an indication of the interpretive problem that lower courts were going to face.
18. "We deal here with wages-a specialized type of property presenting distinct problems in our economic system." Id. at 340.
19. "The idea of wage garnishment in advance of judgment .. .is a most inhuman
doctrine." Id. (citing 114 CONG. REc. 1832 (1968)); "The result is that a prejudgment garnishment of the Wisconsin type may as a practical matter drive a wage-earning family to the
wall." 395 U.S. at 341-42.
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balancing test had been employed. 20 Therefore, they focused on the substance
and effect of the taking in deciding whether due process had been afforded.
In other jurisdictions Sniadach was more liberally construed. Refusing to read
the opinion as sanctioning a balancing approach, these courts concluded that
the case established a procedural rule to be followed in all but exceptional
circumstances.21
In a series of subsequent cases the Supreme Court applied the Sniadach
rationale to additional circumstances. However, because the Court continued
to stress the importance of the property interest at stake, these decisions
seemed to lend support to both the substantive and procedural theories. 22 The
Court finally considered the validity of each interpretation in Fuentes v.
Shevin. 23 Declaring that the pre-judgment replevin of goods by the local

20. E.g., Brunswick Corp. v. J. & P., Inc., 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970); Termplan, Inc.
v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 270, 463 P.2d 68 (1969); Mills v. Bartlett, 265 A.2d 39 (Del.
Super. 1970).
21. "Sniadach . . . dictates that, except in extraordinary circumstances, an individual may
not be deprived of his life, liberty or property without notice and hearing." Randone v.
Appellate Dep't, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 547, 488 P.2d 13, 19, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 715 (1971) (disallowing attachment of property by an unsecured creditor in an ex parte proceeding). See also
Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970) (landlord's lien); Santiago v. McElroy, 319
F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (landlord's distress for rent); Laprease v. Raymours Furniture
Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970) (replevin); Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D.
Cal. 1970) (innkeeper's lien); Larson v. Retherston, 44 Wis. 2d 712, 172 N.W.2d 20 (1969)
(garnishment of a bank account). In stating: "Such summary procedure may well meet the
requirements of due process in extraordinary situations," Justice Douglas had implied that
not all deprivations of property without prior notice and hearing violated due process. 395
U.S. at 339. He did not, however, shed any light on the type of situation that would escape
Sniadach's requirements.
22. In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), the Court stressed the "brutal need" and
immediate harm in holding that a termination or suspension of welfare payments without
affording a prior opportunity for an evidentiary hearing violated due process; in Wisconsin
v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 33 (1971), the Court struck down a Wisconsin statute that permitted a sheriff to post the names of persons to whom liquor should not be sold without
prior notice and hearing, stressing the degradation and possible oppressive results of such
an action; in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), the Court stressed the "basic position," which the marriage relationship enjoys in our society, in holding that a state cannot
deny access to its courts to anyone seeking dissolution of a marriage solely because of inability to pay fees and costs; and in Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971), where the Court
struck down Georgia's automobile financial responsibility statute, was perhaps the first indication of the Court's inclinations. Although the Court did note that a driver's license "may
become essential," there was a perceptible shift in emphasis away from the stress on the
importance of the interest involved.
23. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). Mrs. Fuentes had purchased a stove and stereo, signing conditional sales contracts. When a dispute arose over the servicing of the stove, she stopped making payments. Her refusal to pay triggered an acceleration clause in the contracts and resulted in a replevin action. Mrs. Fuentes did not learn of these proceedings until a deputy
sheriff came to seize the goods. Because she was afforded neither notice nor an opportunity
for a hearing prior to the seizure, Mrs. Fuentes challenged Florida's pre-judgment replevin
law, which authorized summary seizure of goods by state agents upon an ex parte application of a private party who posted a security bond for double the value of the property, as
violative of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
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sheriff violated the fourteenth amendment, the Court specifically rejected the
24
substantive interpretation, saying that Sniadach was:
[]n the mainstream of past cases, having little or nothing to do with
the absolute "necessities" of life but establishing that due process requires an opportunity for a hearing before a deprivation of property
takes effect.
The Fuentes decision thus established that the type of property interest
involved was not crucial to the Sniadach holding. Rather, procedural protection was extended to any "significant property interest. '25 However, because
Fuentes so clearly involved direct state participation, the Court was not compelled to deal with the state action issue, 26 thus raising the question of whether
the state action must be "direct." A logical interpretation of Fuentes would
be that all ordinary, 27 state authorized dispossessions not preceded by notice
and an opportunity to be heard are condemned. 28 However, under a narrower
reading, the opinion can be construed to require a finding of direct state action before the fourteenth amendment will be invoked, 29 with the critical in-

24. Id. at 88.
25. Id. at 86. In holding that appellants had been deprived of such an interest, the
Court cited the facts that they had agreed to pay a major finance charge in exchange for
immediate possession, that they had made substantial installment payments, and that their
possessory interests were protected by a contract.
26. The Court phrased the Fuentes issue as: "[W]hether procedural due process in the
context of these cases requires an opportunity for a hearing before the State authorizes its
agents to seize property in the possession of a person upon the application of another." Id.
at 80 (emphasis added). Since the presence of state action was not at issue, the Court was
not compelled to justify its finding of state action.
27. The Court indicated that certain "extraordinary circumstances" involving an important public purpose, a need for swift action, and state control of the procedure might
place the repossession outside the scope of the Fuentes mandate. Id. at 90-91.
28. Discussing the potential impact of the Fuentes decision, Professor Anderson said:
"The fact that the courts are not involved in such self-help is not any assurance of the continued validity of the right of nonjudicial repossession. If repossession without a hearing is
wrong, is it any the less a wrong when the creditor acts on his own and the courts are not
involved? Likewise, if repossession without a hearing is wrong, does it not become wrong
for the state to tell the creditor by way of UNIFORM COMMERcIAL CODE §9-503, that he can
repossess without a hearing as long as he doesn't go to court?" 4 R. ANDERSEN, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 133 (2d ed. Supp. 1972-1973). See also Clark & Sanders, Sniadach, Fuentes
and Beyond: The Creditor Meets the Constitution, 59 VA. L. REv. 355 (1973).
29. Regarding the Fuentes rule as coextensive with the fourteenth amendment might in
itself be an oversimplification of the situation. Because the gist of the problem facing the
Court was the relative importance of the debtor's property right and the creditor's security
interest, Fuentes can be construed as merely balancing these competing interests within its
own context of direct state action. Therefore, before extending the rule to fact situations
involving the state in a different fashion, lower courts may feel compelled to address a dual
state action question: (1) Is there sufficient state involvement to invoke the fourteenth
amendment, and (2) should the Fuentes rule be applied to the type of state action under
consideration? See Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 121 N.J. Super. 1, 295 A.2d 402 (Super.
Ct. 1972), where the court first held self-help repossession by a creditor insufficient state
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quiry being the extent to which the state has participated in effecting the
deprivation of the debtor's property interest. 30
The instant court began its analysis of the state action question by defining the scope of the fourteenth amendment's protection. Relying primarily
on the Civil Rights Cases of 188331 the court stated that the significant state
involvement 3- necessary to invoke the fourteenth amendment would not be
found in the purely private, voluntary conduct of an individual because there
33
would be no "active assistance or cooperation on the part of the state."
Noting further that Fuentes and its precursors involved active participation
by state agents, the instant court concluded that this line of cases involved no
3
expansion in the state action concept.

4

The court then applied its state action standard to the facts of the instant
case. Pointing out that conditional sales contracts with self-help provisions
had been judicially approved in Florida long before the adoption of the
Code,3 5 the court stated that the agreement the appellee had signed required
no statutory sanction for its validity. Therefore, the court concluded: 36

action to invoke the fourteenth amendment, and then further stated that even if state action
sufficient to invoke the fourteenth amendment had been found it would not extend the
Fuentes rule to a creditor's self-help repossession in a situation where it was common
knowledge among debtors that repossession followed default.
30. The great weight of authority considering the constitutionality of UNrIORM COMMERCIAL CODE, §9-503, favors the "direct" interpretation of Fuentes, holding that self-help
repossession by a creditor does not involve sufficient state action to invoke the fourteenth
amendment. See, e.g., Kirksey v. Theilig, 351 F. Supp. 727 (D. Colo. 1972); Pease v. Havelock
Nat'l Bank, 351 F. Supp. 118 (D. Neb. 1972); Greene v. First Nat'l Exch. Bank, 348 F. Supp.
672 (W.D. Va. 1972); Oller v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972); McCormick
v. First Nat'l Bank, 322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1971); Giglio v. Bank of Delware, 307 A.2d
816 (Del. Ch. 1973); Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 121 N.J. Super. 1, 295 A.2d 402 (Super.
Ct. 1972); Brown v. United States Nat'l Bank,
Ore.
,509 P.2d 442 (1973). The only
case adopting the "authorization" interpretation and holding U.C.C. §9-503 unconstitutional,
Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), is currently on appeal to the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
31. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
32. Citing Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), the instant court said: "The state
must significantly involve itself in the activities by private parties in order for those activities to take on constitutional dimensons." 282 So. 2d at 621.
33. 282 So. 2d at 620.
34. Id. at 621. The court quoted with approval Greene v. First Nat'l Exch. Bank, 348
F. Supp. 672, 674 (W.D. Va. 1972), which declared: "In this area . . .due process is denied
only when an arm of the state acts directly against an individual's property and deprives
him of it without notice or a hearing." The Greene court drew its conclusion that direct
state action was required from several cases (including those mentioned in note 22 supra),
which had relied on Sniadach in holding that a deprivation of property without notice and
an opportunity to be heard violated due process.
35. The court cited C.I.T. Corp. v. Reeves, 112 Fla. 424, 150 So. 638 (1933); Percifield v.
State, 93 Fla. 247, 111 So. 519 (1927); Bank of Jasper v. Tuten, 62 Fla. 423, 57 So. 238 (1911);
and McGriff v. Porter, 5 Fla. 373 (1853), as authorities for this statement.
36. 282 So. 2d at 622.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol26/iss2/13

6

Candelora: Debtor-Creditor Relations: The Florida Supreme Court Helps Those
CASE COMMENTS

1974]

Section 679.503 merely recognizes the parties' right to contract in such
a manner if they so desire and is really insignificant to the transaction
when we consider whether it constitutes state action.
Having thus concluded that section 679.503 "creates no new rights,"3 7 the
court held mere "codification or restatement of a common law right and a
contract right" insufficient state cooperation to turn a private repossession
into state action. 38
Because of the logic employed, the instant holding is a narrow one. A
comparison of pre-Code Florida law39 with section 679.50340 reveals that in
contracts without a repossession provision, a creditor would have been unable
to use self-help prior to the adoption of the Code, but he would have this
right under section 679.503. Consequently, if the court's assertion that "section 679.503 is no more than a codification or restatement of a common law
right.., and creates no new rights" -1 is taken on its face, the conclusion that
the court construed the statute to require a contractual provision authorizing
self-help is compelled. However, since the contract in question contained a
self-help provision, the facts did not require the instant court to address the
distinction. Therefore, the better interpretation of the holding is that where
a creditor repossesses pursuant to a contractual provision, the mere existence
of section 679.503 is insufficient to invoke the fourteenth amendment.
Despite the fact that the instant case merely affirms prior law, it should be
viewed as a triumph for commercial interests. 42 By confirming the validity of

37.

Id.

38. Id.
39. "When default has occurred in the payment of such obligation the vendor has the
legal right to take possession of the property, sell the same and apply the proceeds to the
payment of the obligation, and, if the note or contract contains the provision that the
vendor under such conditions may repossess the property without process of law, then the
vendor may repossess such property without resorting to legal process, if he can do so without committing a breach of the peace or an unlawful trespass." Percifield v, State, 93 Fla.
247, 250, 111 So. 519, 520 (1927), quoted in Northside Motors of Florida, Inc. v. Brinkley, 282

So. 2d 617, 622 (Fla. 1973) (emphasis added).
40. The language of the statute is set out in note 2 supra.
41. 282 So. 2d at 622.
42. In advocating the constitutionality of UNFORm COMMERICAL CODE, §9-503, Professor
Mentschikoff stated that the Code attempts to provide "a fair allocation of the burdens, risks
and rights of the parties to a secured transaction in a system of self-help and private disposition of collateral." Mentschikoff, Peaceful Repossession Under the Uniform Commercial Code:
A Constitutional and Economic Analysis, 14 Wm. 8: MARY L. REv. 767, 772 (1973). From this

perspective, condoning self-help repossessions would result in a benefit to both parties rather
than merely a triumph for creditors. But see Clark & Landers, supra note 28, at 381-83 where

it is contended that the Code contains a strong bias in favor of creditors.
The thrust of Professor Mentschikoff's argument is that the cost benefits resulting from
sanctioning self-help outweigh the inconvenience suffered by "one in ten thousand defaulting
debtors who might conceivably be saved a week or 10-60 days temporary deprivation of the
use of an automobile," by a system requiring notice and an opportunity to be heard, espedally where the scheme sanctioning self-help provides for expeditious judicial relief to an
aggrieved debtor. Mentschikoff, supra, at 769-70. However, it is difficult to fathom the rel-
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self-help repossessions, the decision has removed the cloud of doubt that
Fuentes had cast over the remedy. Moreover, since the critical issue for creditors is the legality of the action, not the basis for its validity, the fact that
purely statutory repossessions are still constitutionally suspect should cause
them no great concern.4 3 Indeed, creditors can obviate the question by merely
inserting a repossession clause in their contracts. Finally, because the instant
case relies on contract and common law rather than constitutional grounds
for upholding self-help, it could insulate Florida creditors from a potential
United States
Supreme Court decision holding Code section 9-503 uncon44
stitutional.

evance of the cost argument in light of Justice Stewart's statements in Fuentes that a "prior
hearing always imposes some costs in time, effort, and expense, and it is often more efficient
to dispense with the opportunity for such a hearing. But these rather ordinary costs cannot
outweigh the constitutional right," 407 U.S. at 90 n.22, and that Sniadach "undisputedly
demonstrates that ordinary hearing costs are no more able to override due process rights in
the creditor-debtor context than in other contexts." Id. at 92 n.29. The significance of the
purported ameliorative effect of the Code's post-wrongful seizure remedies is also questionable
because of the statement in Fuentes that "This Court has not . . . embraced the general
proposition that a wrong may be done if it can be undone." Id. at 82, quoting Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647 (1972).
43. In dicta concerning the trial decision, the instant court indicated it would not extend
the Fuentes rule to the instant fact situation even if state action sufficient to invoke the
fourteenth amendment had been found. Id. at 620, 623-24. By combining the Supreme Court's
framing of the Fuentes issue in terms of active state participation with the Court's statement
that its holding was a narrow one, the instant court concluded that the Fuentes rationale
should not have been applied to these facts. Apparently the court interprets the "narrow
holding" in Fuentes as referring to the situations in which a pre-seizure hearing is required.
However, the Fuentes opinion in context reads: "Our holding, however, is a narrow one. We
do not question the power of a state to seize goods before a final judgment in order to
protect the security interests of creditors so long as these creditors have tested their claim to
the goods through the process of a fair prior hearing." 407 U.S. at 96 (1972) (emphasis
added). Thus, it appears more likely that the Court's intent was to emphasize that it was
not outlawing all pre-final judgment seizures but only those not preceded by a meaningful
hearing. If this interpretation is adopted the difference in the type of state action involved
would not preclude the extension of the Fuentes rule to the instant case. Moreover, in Hall
v. Garson, 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1971), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a landlord's self-help dispossession of a tenant's property based solely on a statutory right violated
due process. Citing the Hall case the District Court for the Southern District of Florida
struck down Florida's landlord lien statute stating: "The landlords in this case possessed certain powers by virtue of these state statutes and made possible only by the authority of
state law; their actions were clothed with the authority of state law and were 'state actions'
taken under color of state law ...." Barber v. Rader, 350 F. Supp. 183, 189 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
If the alternative interpretation of Fuentes and this strongly persuasive precedent in a
closely analogous situation were presented, the Florida court might well hold that a
creditor's self-help repossession based solely on a statutory right violates due process.
44. If the United States Supreme Court were to declare UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE,
§9-503 unconstitutional a debtor suing a creditor who had repossessed on the basis of a
contract right would have to establish two elements: (1) state action, and (2) deprivation of
a constitutionally protected right. In Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), the Supreme Court
held that state court enforcement of restrictive covenants based on race or color violated the
fourteenth amendment. In Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), where one party to a
restrictive covenant sued another for its breach, the Court also found state court enforcement
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As a practical matter, requiring an adversary hearing before every repossession could result in a disruption of commercial credit relationships outweighing the consumer benefit.45 When viewed in this light the instant court's
rejection of the Fuentes remedy cannot be condemned. However, invoking the
procedural requirements of the fourteenth amendment was the only means
by which the Supreme Court could prevent the subversion of the debtor's
property right to the creditor's security interest. The instant court, on the
other hand, could have minimized credit obstructions while providing the
debtor's property interest with a reasonable measure of procedural protection
by making notice from the creditor, with the burden of requesting a pre-repossession hearing then shifting to the debtor, a prerequisite to the validity
of self-help clauses. By ignoring this alternative, the instant court has rendered
a decision that rejects the spirit of Fuentes and does not conform to sound
public policy. 48
If the instant decision is taken to be a final determination of the validity
of self-help repossession in Florida, the focus of the legal conflict could well
shift to the question: What constitutes a breach of the peace in this context?
Although the instant court addressed this question in dicta, 47 the proposed

of a covenantor's right to be state action. These cases strongly suggest that state action would
be found in the hypothetical case. However, in Barrows the Court said: "[Shelley] did not
make the covenant itself invalid, no one would be punished for making it, and no one's
constitutional rights were violated by the covenantor's voluntary adherence thereto." Id. at
253. Therefore, the Court had to find a constitutional right that enforcement of the
covenant violated before the state action could be condemned. For this reason, the hypothetical decision would turn on the effectiveness of the repossession clause as a waiver of
the debtor's due process rights.
That a corporate debtor can agree in advance to waive his constitutional rights was recognized in D.H. Overmyer, Inc. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972). The effectiveness of such a relinquishment was extended to an individual consumer in Swarb v. Lenox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972).
Nevertheless, by stressing that the waiver must be knowing and intelligent to be effective, the
Court strongly indicated that each subsequent case would be judged on its own facts. In
Fuentes the majority circumvented the waiver question by stating that the repossession
clauses in the installment sales contracts were too vague to be effective as waivers of constitutional rights. 407 U.S. at 95-96. On the other hand, in his dissent Justice White contended that creditors could nullify the effect of Fuentes by merely securing the proper type
of waiver. 407 U.S. at 102.
45. See Mentschikoff, supra note 42, at 780. This point was also raised in the instant
case by an amicus curiae brief. See Brief, supra note 8.
46. In his dissent, Justice Ervin called self-help "an instrument of oppression that has
no place in a modern society." 282 So. 2d at 628. He further stated: "What is deprecated
herein is statutorily countenanced 'self-help' which allows sellers to contractually suspend
prior notice of repossession of personalty and to bargain away the opportunity of the buyer
to be judicially heard as to any defenses he may have. Such extralegal, one-sided statutory
grants favoring sellers and lenders are inimical to due process of law and contrary to good
public poficy." Id.
47. The instant court pointed out that appellee had not alleged that appellant had
breached the peace while repossessing. Id. at 625.
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